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What we measure affects what we do. If 
we  have  the  wrong  measures,  we  will 
strive  for  the  wrong  things.”  J.  Stiglitz, 





   
GDP as an indicator is relatively recent. It was introduced seventy years ago and like many other 
institutions it is an issue of the historical period in which it was created in the years between the 
Great Depression and World War II. The adoption of the GDP as an indicator is not a neutral 
choice, but rather the logical consequence of a well-defined theoretical paradigm in which GDP 
appears the essential tool apt to promote well-being and development. Since then, however, times 
have changed, new problems have emerged and new theories and approaches have been developed 
to address them. Starting from these considerations the paper examines the problems connected 
with adopting an indicator as an absolute measure of progress. Indicators, in fact, are not neutral: 
they are the result of a specific economic approach; hence they are biased in nature and contribute 
to define policies that are implemented. After reviewing the main theories and indicators introduced 
by literature in the last sixty years, we propose to adopt a different approach according to which 
progress is measured against stated goals and not in absolute terms. Subsequently, we present an 
example of this approach by introducing a new indicator (ICSES – Index of Competitiveness and 
Social and Environmental Sustainability) to measure the performance of EU countries vis-à-vis the 
goals explicitly stated by the European Union.  
 
Sommario 
Il PIL è un indicatore relativamente recente. È stato introdotto 70 anni fa e, come molti altri istituti, 
è la conseguenza diretta degli avvenimenti e del dibattito del periodo storico nel quale fu elaborato, 
ovvero gli anni tra la grande depressione e la seconda guerra mondiale. L’adozione del PIL come 
indicatore non rappresenta una scelta neutrale, ma la conseguenza logica di un preciso paradigma 
teorico nel quale il PIL viene assunto come lo strumento per promuovere benessere e sviluppo. Da 
allora, tuttavia, i tempi sono cambiati, nuovi problemi sono emersi e sono stati sviluppati nuovi 
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approcci  e  teorie  per  affrontarli.  Partendo  da  tali  considerazioni  il  paper  esamina  i  problemi 
connessi con l’adozione di un indicatore come misura assoluta del progresso. Se gli indicatori non 
sono neutrali, ma il risultato di un approccio economico preciso, essi sono per loro natura biased e 
contribuiscono a definire le politiche che vengono varate e portate avanti. Dopo aver ripercorso le 
principali teorie e indicatori proposti dalla letteratura negli ultimi 60 anni, proponiamo di adottare 
un  approccio  differente  per  il  quale  il  progresso  viene  misurato  rispetto  ad  obiettivi  definiti  e 
accettati  e  non  in  modo  assoluto.  Successivamente  presentiamo  un  esempio  di  tale  approccio 
introducendo  un  nuovo  indicatore  (ICSES  –  Indice  di  Competitività  e  Sostenibilità  Sociale  e 
Ambientale)  per  misurare  la  performance  dei  paesi  dell’Unione  Europea  rispetto  agli  obiettivi 
definiti in sede europea.  
 
 
Key words: ISES, GDP , Sustainability, Human Development, Wellbeing.  
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In this paper, may be aiming a bit too high, we propose a different approach towards the definition 
of what determines wellbeing and consequently the policies to implement and the indicators to use. 
We dispute the idea that the determinants of wellbeing, i.e. what improves or worsen the life of a 
given society, should be a matter of economists debating on the role of growth, on that of schooling 
or any other factor, and therefore propose a different way of approaching the issue. We do this first 
by examining the relation between indicators, policies, goals and the concept of wellbeing, starting 
form the classic dispute between growth and development (par. 2). We then focus on the relation 
between indicators and the theoretical paradigms to which they refer (par. 3). In the subsequent 
paragraph we highlight the limits of indicators based on these, or other paradigms, and propose 
instead an up-side down approach in which goals are determined in the context of a political and 
democratic process and indicators are then elaborated to measure the achievement rate of these 
goals (par.4). Finally, as a mere example, we highlight some goals that have been defined according 
to such a process and propose a synthetic indicator to measure the rate of achievement of these 
goals (par. 5).   
 
2. Wellbeing, growth and development: are they in fact related? 
 
Since its birth, in the 1940s, GDP has been the object both of sharp criticism and of enthusiastic 
approval  and  support
2.  Disputes  have  proliferated  among  economists,  highlighting  limits  and 
virtues  of  what  has  become  probably  the  most  well-known  and  used  economic  indicator. 
Alternative indicators have been proposed, in many cases to be quickly left aside. Except for a 
couple of them which have gained ground becoming more and more known and used not only 
among academics, but also among policy-makers and journalists – it is the case of the Measure of 
Economic  Welfare  -MEW-  (Nordhaus  and  Tobin,  1972)  and,  more  recently,  of  the  Human 
Development Index -HDI- (UNDP, 1990). 
 
All through this long lasting controversy theoretical problems as well as methods of measurement 
                                                 
2 “While the GDP and the rest of the national income accounts may seem to be arcane concepts, they are truly among 
the great inventions of the twentieth century”. Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus in “GDP: One of the Great 
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have been debated. Ideas flourished, and often clashed, thus contributing to the development of the 
economic doctrine. For how rich and fulfilling the debate has been, by taking a retrospective view 
one cannot brush aside the subtle and disturbing feeling that, somehow, sometime, the point has 
been lost and the perspective that has characterised the debate is not exactly the right one. It might 
look right at first, but, as in the gallery Francesco Borromini designed for Palazzo Spada in Rome, 
the impression might be the result of an optical trick: a closer look reveals that things are in reality 
quite different from what they appear.   
 
GDP,  HDI  and  most  other  indicators  that  have  progressively  been  elaborated  are  indicators  of 
performance. They give us information, raw, approximate, imperfect, but nevertheless information, 
on how a given community (usually a nation) performs in a given period of time and pursuing a 
specific goal.  
 
This is the first point that, obvious as it might sound, needs all the same to be highlighted: the 
soundness of an indicator is directly linked to the given goal. It is from this relation that much of the 
debate  has  aroused  since  the  early  1970s,  or  at  least  the  debate  which  did  not  focus  on  the 
improvement of GDP as an indicator. For in these years, with the development of the Basic Needs 
approach,  the  dispute  moved  from  the  indicator  to  the  goals.  The  problem  was  not  GDP,  but 
growth. It was in these days that the concept of development has been enriched and set against that 
of growth. Until then, the two, though distinct, had been pretty much related. It might then be useful 
to briefly retrace the progressive evolution of the two concepts in order to set the terms for some 
further considerations. 
 
2.1 Growth and Development 
The first analyst to make a distinction between growth and development was Schumpeter (1932). 
The Austrian economist defined growth as a gradual process of productive expansion, in which 
several  goods  of  the  same  kind  are  produced  using  the  same  methods,  while  he  defined 
development  as  a  more  complex  phenomenon  that  leads  to  a  complete  transformation  of  the 
productive process and the introduction of new goods. Thus, growth might be seen as the evolution 
of an economy in the short term, while development has to do with the structural evolution or 
transformation of the economy in the long term. This distinction between short and long term is the 
one  that  has  since  then  characterised  the  debate.  In  talking  about  development,  marginalist 
economists focused on accumulation and saving decisions, while Keynes highlighted the role of a 
progressive increase of the allocation of fixed capital. But the spotlight remained in any case on 
production  and  did  not  move  from  there  until  the  1970s.  Even  the  emergence  of  development 
economics in the 1950s (Hirschman, A. O.,1981) did not shift the focus: while advocating different 
mechanisms for developing and developed economies, economists like Lewis (1954), Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956) continued to stress growth as the main goal. Not surprisingly, both concepts, 
growth and development, referred to GDP as their main indicator. 
 
It is only in the 1970s that a new school of economists began to dispute the strict relation between 
growth and development and proposed new ways of measuring the latter in alternative to GDP
3. 
Since then the debate has walked a long way, thanks to the contribution among others of Myrdal 
(1960), Streeten (1979, 1981), Sen (1979,1982,1985), Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987), and the 
staff of economists that contributed to the first Human Development Report published by UNDP 
                                                 
3 There have been many attempts prior to the 1970s to warn on the use of GDP, but either they failed to propose 
effective alternatives or have gone unheard. As reminded Noorbakhsh (1996):“The origin of the critique of the use of 
GDP per capita for measuring the level of development in different countries can probably be traced back to the 
pioneering United Nations Reports (United Nations 1954) in which specific recommendation were made against the use 
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(1990),  further  qualifying  the  distinction  between  the  two  concepts  and  hence  the  goals  to  be 
pursued by policymakers. 
 
2.2 The real issue 
We  refer  more  in  detail  to  this  evolution  of  economic  thought  in  the  next  paragraph.  What  is 
interesting  here  is  that  much  of  this  evolution  and  of  the  ensuing  debate  among  the  different 
approaches  has  been  linked  to  and  determined  by  the  concept  of  wellbeing.  The  advocates  of 
growth closely relate the concept of growth to that of wellbeing: the richer the society, the greater 
the means to improve the life of all its members. To put things in brutal terms: an increase in GDP 
per capita equals an increase of wellbeing of the individuals. And this notwithstanding the warning 
made by the creator of GDP, Kuznets, who clearly stated that “The welfare of a nation can scarcely 
be inferred from a measurement of National income as defined above” (Kuznets, 1934)
4.  
 
The  strict  relation  between  growth  and  wellbeing  was  strongly  disputed  by  the  Basic  Needs 
approach and ever since by the advocates of development. Criticism included among others the 
issues of income distribution and the failure of the trickle down approach (Seers, 1969), satisfaction 
of  basic  needs,  the  role  of  human  capital  and  education,  sustainability  and  pollution.  Thus, 
development, as a broader and more complex concept than growth, evolved in the capability of 
ensuring  the  leading  of  a  full  and  decent  life  in  a  sustainable  and  durable  way,  i.e.  in  stably 
improving the wellbeing of a society and of most if not all of its members.  
 
At stake in the debate on growth and development then there were not simply different indicators or 
different goals pursued, but different concepts of wellbeing. The same can be said for all the other 
main approaches proposed up until today, including the one that focuses on happiness (Easterlin, 
2001; Frey, B.S. and Stutzer, A. 2002; Layard, 2005).  
 
It is worth noticing that none of the approaches cited above, nor any others, venture in defining 
wellbeing. For pretentious as economists can be, only few would venture in such perilous waters 
and at their own risks. Better, much better, to leave the task to philosophers
5. An understandable 
caution as it would be rather difficult to insert wellbeing into an econometric model: what dummy 
should one use?  
 
All the above approaches, instead, stop a step before, focusing on “what” determines, conditions,  
and affects wellbeing. Is it the amount of product produced? Is it the level of schooling and sanitary 
conditions?  Is  it  the  capability  of  accessing  means  to  improve  one’s  life?  Once  defined  the 
determinants of wellbeing through an apparently solid theoretical apparatus, they become goals for 
the society to pursue; and the process is monitored through the chosen indicator (Kahneman, D. and 
Krueger, A.B., 2006; Kahneman, D., Krueger, A.B., Schkade D., Schwarz N., and Stone A., 2004) 
 
If all the above is accepted, different approaches that focus on the same determinants of wellbeing 
might be grouped together, and it is what we are doing in the next paragraph, arbitrarily giving them 
the  status  of  “paradigms”.  But,  before,  there  is  another  preliminary  point  which  is  worth 
considering  What  we  are  saying  here  is  that  policies  pursued  by  governments  to  ensure  the 
wellbeing of their people (a best case scenario) are determined by the goals set,  and that the same 
goals are defined on the basis of a theoretical approach which considers some “determinants of 
wellbeing” more effective or important than others. And here comes the big question: are we really 
sure that economist and their theories, – complex, deep and full of insight as they might be – should 
                                                 
4 Such articulated critics brought Kuznets to end in 1940 his relation with US Department of Commerce that had 
commissioned the studies which  later on led to the GDP definition. 
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really be the ones to decide what increases people’s wellbeing? It this really the best way of doing 
it? We have some doubts and will try to argue this point in the fourth paragraph. First, however, we 
would like to examine more closely the relation between indicators and their “paradigm”. 
 
3. Paradigms evolution and the related indicators  
 
According to Kuhn (1962) “the development of science is driven, in normal periods of science, by 
adherence to a paradigm. The function of a paradigm is to supply puzzles for scientists to solve and 
to provide the tools for their solution. A crisis in science arises when confidence in the ability is lost 
of the paradigm to solve particularly worrying puzzles called anomalies. The crisis is followed by a 
scientific revolution if the existing paradigm is superseded by a rival”. Kuhn claimed that science 
guided by one paradigm would be ‘incommensurable’ with science developed under a different 
paradigm, meaning that there is no common measure of the different scientific theories. (Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy).  
 
Kuhn’s  proposition,  written  to  describe  the  process  of  development  of  science,  might  be  well 
applied  to  economics,  theory  and  policy.  As  in  the  case  of  science,  economic  theory  has  its 
paradigms, sets of linkages, relations, sometimes laws, that try to explain economic relations and 
behaviour  of  human  beings,  both  as  individuals  and  as  collective  entities.  As  is  the  case  with 
science, paradigms are often at odds, even when they coexist; and after a (usually long) period of 
time, sometimes blend together to form a new paradigm. Each paradigm, or corpus of economic 
theory,  reflects  a  vision  or  a  point  of  view  on  society  and  on  individual,  and  thus  focuses  on 
different aspects. Goals are different, means are different, and so are the indicators that measure the 
accomplishing or not of the stated goal and the policies that might be put in place to that aim. If to 
adopt a paradigm is, as stated by Kuhn, “to supply puzzles for scientists to solve and to provide the 
tools for their solution", by adopting an economic theory, or paradigm, economists and policy-
makers also adopt a set of goals, indicators and policies.  
 
Our  point  here  is  that  indicators  are  not  just  technical  tools.  It  is  easy  to  consider  them  as 
independent from theoretical disputes, while they are anchored to a certain paradigm and part of it, 
and therefore play a very strategic role in setting policy. The consequences of this connection 
between theory/paradigm and indicators has strong implications. When an independent institution 
like ECB, OECD, WB or IMF decides to measure wellbeing or economic development through an 
indicator, and not through another, it is implicitly choosing a theoretical approach and consequently 
the policies to apply.  
 
In  this  section  we  present  as  an  example  three  theoretical  paradigms  pointing  out  the  related 
indicators.  
 
i)  The first paradigm that we consider is the set of theories that focus on economic growth, 
namely  neoclassical,  monetarist,  Keynesian  and  Marxist  theories.  While  extremely 
different and in many cases at odds one with the other, all of them have growth at their 
core and as an end in itself, and since its creation, all of them refer to and use GDP as 
the indicator of how well an economy is doing. 
ii)  The second paradigm we refer to is the Basic Needs approach that developed in the mid 
1970s to “solve the puzzle” of developing economies. Rather than a single indicator, this 
approach relies on a multiplicity of social indicators that try to capture basic needs for 
individuals.  
iii)  The third paradigm that we bring as an example is human development, based on the 
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Development Index, that came to light thanks to ul Halq (2003) in May 1990 when the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published the first Human Development 
Report . 
 
3.1. Economic growth paradigm and the role of GDP 
The Great Depression of 1929 deeply shook economic policy and theory. Suddenly both appeared 
to be of little use in helping western economies to “solve the puzzle” and sketch a way out from the 
greatest crash of all. New approaches and policies had to be put in place, a new paradigm was 
needed. And it came. Architects of this paradigmatic revolution were two major figures of the 
century: J.M. Keynes and F.D Roosevelt (Galbraith, 1958). 
 
Among  other  changes,  the  Great  Depression  highlighted  the  lack  of  data  and  of  indicators 
functional to analyse and monitor the evolution of an economy leading  to the development of 
national accounts (U.S. Department of Commerce – BEA, 1999). In order to fill  this gap the GDP 
was conceived.
6. It was constructed on the basis of theories developed by Kuznets (1934), Leontieff 
(1936), Keynes (1936), Meade (1936), Clark (1937) and Meade and Stone (1941). As recalled by 
Canoy et al. (2007) “In the 1930s the US Department of Commerce commissioned Simon Kuznets 
to  develop  national  accounts.  These  national  accounts  are  by  itself  a  rich  source  of  statistical 
information with many usages. One of its usages is to calculate GDP by measuring final purchases 
by  households,  business,  and  government  by  summing  consumption,  investment,  government 
spending, and net exports”.   
 
The link with the Keynesian model is evident. Keynes' income-expenditure model states that real 
GDP can be broken up into four component parts: consumption, investment, government spending, 
and net exports (Y = C + I + E + G). GDP is equal to Y and represents a measure of all the goods 
and services produced domestically
7.  
 
While  developed  in  a  Keynesian  “environment”,  GDP  soon  becomes  the  indicator  used  by  all 
economists, be they Keynesian, neoclassical, monetarist or Marxist. This happened because, while 
their analysis of the functioning of the economy and of the behaviour of single individuals differed, 
all of these approaches shared a common goal, at least at the macroeconomic level: growth. And 
GDP, as an indicator that, in spite of all its limits (van Der Berg, 2009;  Stiglitz J.E., Sen A., 
Fitoussi JP.,  (2009a)), is able to provide a good approximation on the growth trend of an economy, 
and that on top of it can be used to compare data in different countries, turns out to be the perfect 
tool.  Because of this common goal, aggregate production increase, and within the scope of this 
paper, we will refer to this set of theories as the “growth paradigm” and to GDP as its indicator.  
 
3.2 Basic Needs approach and the rise of social indicators  
                                                 
6 In this regard it might interesting to report two quotations: 
“One reads with dismay of Presidents Hoover and then Roosevelt designing policies to combat the Great Depression of 
the 1930's on the basis of such sketchy data as stock price indices, freight car loadings, and incomplete indices of 
industrial production. The fact was that comprehensive measures of national income and output did not exist at the 
time. The Depression, and with it the growing role of government in the economy, emphasized the need for such 
measures and led to the development of a comprehensive set of national income accounts”. Richard T. Froyen  
"Only those who had a personal share in the economic mobilization for World War I could realize in how many ways 
and how much estimates of national income covering 20 years and classified in several ways facilitated the World War 
II effort." Wesley C. Mitchell, Director, National Bureau of Economic Research.   
Both quotations are from “GDP: One of the Great Inventions of the 20th Century. ”Bureau of Economic analysis U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1999. http://www.bea.gov/scb/account_articles/general/0100od/maintext.htm 
7 “Growth economics had arise autonomously from development theory as direct offspring of the Keynes system and of 
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In the mid 1970s a new theoretical approach began to develop leading to the elaboration of new 
indicators to measure the progress of a society. The need for a new approach was increasingly felt 
among many academics and researchers in order to overcome the failure of the “trickle down” 
effect and the inability of economic growth to solve the problem of income distribution, that is, the 
puzzle of how to grant progress to everyone when the economy grows and also of how to measure 
real poverty given the inadequacy of GDP for the purpose.
8. The Basic Needs approach was the 
most developed reply in this sense, providing new concepts and tools to define and measure poverty 
(ILO, 1976; Stewart, 1985; Streeten, 1979,1981). It focused on four aspects, identified as the ones 
able  to  promote  the  development  of  a  nation,  and  particularly  that  of  the  poorest  part  of  its 
population: 
 
i) increase poorest people’s chance to produce income; 
ii)  strengthen  production  and  distribution  of  public  services,  in  a  way  that  they  can 
effectively reach the most in  need; 
iii)  improve  production  of  commodities  or  services  able  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  all  the 
members of the “household”; 
iv) stimulate population participation in the decision process as to the nature of basic needs 
and the way they can be satisfied. 
 
Such shift of focus, from growth of the aggregate economy to the needs to be satisfied to determine 
a  real  development,  implied  changing  methods  of  measurement.  Indicators  had  to  shift  from 
measuring the growth of aggregate production to assessing the satisfaction rate of the identified 
basic needs. According to this paradigm indicators had to focus on six areas: health, nutrition, 
environmental health, water supply, housing, education, i.e. the core of “Basic Needs”. For each of 
these areas basic needs scholars tried to define the best indicator able to describe how much the 
need in question was satisfied.  
 
Among  the  most  frequently  used  indicators  for  measuring  Basic  Needs  we  can  include  the 
following:   
 
−  health: life expectancy at birth, percentage of doctors or other health care professionals on 
the population, number of hospital beds and population ratio, share of health costs over the 
GDP; 
−  nutrition: calorie protein diet; 
−  environmental health: infant mortality rate, proportion of population that has certain levels 
of services and hygiene equipment; 
−  water supply: infant mortality rate, population regularly supplied with drinking water ratio; 
−  Housing:  rooms-people  ratio,  family  housing  units  possibly  integrated  with  a  certain 
surface-population ratio;  
−  education: literacy rate, schooling rate (5-14 years), same relationship between teachers and 
the  school  population,  or  percentage  of  expenditure  on  education  of  total  government 
expenditure. 
 
Though extremely innovative, and in some ways revolutionary, the Basic Needs approach has never 
had much success on the ground. There are two main reasons for this: on one side it is too radical, 
                                                 
8«...it has become increasingly evident, particularly from the experience of the developing countries, that rapid growth 
at the national level does not automatically reduce poverty or inequality or provide sufficient productive employment» 




  8 
implying drastic economic measures and political reforms; on the other side not only is it far from 
the elegance and the systematisation of the growth paradigm, but it also lacks one single indicator 
that could be gauged over time and across countries, so as to provide information on how a society 
is evolving. Comparing the two, GDP turns out to be much more useful and easy to understand than 
the complex set of indicators proposed by Basic Needs.  
 
However, despite this lack of success in the realm of economic policy, from a theoretical point of 
view the Basic Needs approach had a substantial impact on the debate on growth and development, 
setting a new level of discussion and laying the grounds for the work that followed in the 1980s and 
1990s, most notably the capability approach. Moreover, it has been thanks to the advent of this 
approach that economists and international organisations started to systematically collect data for an 
increasing number of social indicators which eventually provided the hard material for the creation 
of new indexes and in particular of the Human Development Index discussed in the next paragraph.  
 
3.3. Capability approach, Human development and the HDI 
 
For  all  its  efforts  the  Basic  Needs  approach  was  not  able  to  tackle  effectively  the  problem  of 
addressing poverty, principally because, as Amartya Sen reminds us, if you have goods but you 
don't have capabilities to use them, the former are of little help and cannot be transformed into 
function and freedom (Sen, 1999). Thus on the basis of this notion – capability – as worked out by 
the  same  Amartya  Sen  (1971;  1983),  a  new  approach,  known  as  the  Human  Development 
Approach, stemmed out in the early Nineties (Fukuda-Parr, 2003 ). The latter was worked out by 
the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  and  can  be  defined  as  a  normative 
framework for the evaluation of individual wellbeing and social arrangements, and for the design of 
policies  of  social  improvement  (Robeyns,  2005).  The  main  objective  of  Human  Development 
(Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Fukuda-Parr and Kumar, 2003) is to create an environment enabling people to 
enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. It is concerned both with building up human capabilities and 
with using them fully (ul Haq, 2003). In this context, income and economic growth are both means 
for / of development, and not an end in itself. The main purpose of the new paradigm is to answer 
the question of how economic growth transfers, or fails to transfer, into human development. The 
focus then shifts from economic growth to widening people’s choices thanks to the development 
process. These choices can be infinite and change over time (ul Haq, 2003).  
 
As in the case of Basic Needs the new paradigm implied the adoption of new tools to measure 
development. The large amount of literature flourished in the Seventies resulted in a systematic 
collection and publication of data offering an array of socio-economic indicators for a large number 
of  countries.  With  the  availability  of  cross-national  data,  a  number  of  attempts  were  made  to 
construct  composite  indices  which  aimed  to  assess  the  level  of  development  in  a  more 
comprehensive way than GDP per capita. The most important attempt is probably the Human 
Development Index (HDI), proposed by UNDP in its first Human Development Report in 1990 and 
yearly updated since then. HDI is an index which combines three indicators referring to  three major 
dimensions of human development: longevity, knowledge and access to resources. These are to 
represent three of the essential choices ”for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire 
knowledge  and  to  have  access  to  resources,  needed  for  a  decent  standard  of  living”  (Human 
Development Report, 1990). The HDI sets a minimum and a maximum for each dimension and 
then shows where each country stands in relation to a  scale expressed as a value between 0 and 1. 
For each dimensions of development there is an indicator: “a long and  healthy life”  is measured by 
life expectancy, “knowledge” by education, and “a decent standard of living” by GDP.
9 
                                                 
9 For more details on the calculation of HDI see technical note on United Nations Development Programme (various 
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It is worth noticing that, in using income as one of the three indicators, the HDI includes GDP as 
one of its components. A striking difference with the Basic Needs approach is that, as advocated by 
Anand and Sen (2000), the Human Development approach considers income as a mean to acquire a 
“decent life”. By considering it a mean, however, this approach sets itself at a distance from the 
growth paradigm, which sees growth as a goal in itself. Thus, according to the former development 
is  a  multidimensional  concept  with  income  representing  an  important  aspect  of  this 
multidimensionality, but nothing more than that.  
 
Despite the strong differences with the growth paradigm, the inclusion of GDP might have been one 
of the elements that contributed to the increasing popularity of HDI, even though the main factor of 
success has been that finally the proposed alternative to GDP was a single indicator that could 




4. Who should decide? 
 
While strongly different in scope, as to the phenomena measured and the theoretical approach 
underlying them, GDP, the indicators proposed by the Basic Needs approach, and HDI, have all one 
element in common: they are the outcome of a theoretical approach, a paradigm. That is to say that 
they are the result of academic work and debate, often supported or even initiated by the requests 
and needs of economic policy. All three of them measure aspects of human life that according to the 
approach  on  which  they  are  based,  are  reputed  pivotal  to  assess  the  level  of  wellbeing  or 
development reached by a community of human beings. They measure what is considered by their 
advocates to be the right thing, the proper thing to look at, in order to really understand how well 
communities  are  doing.  All  of  these  indicators  have  limits,  and  their  advocates  are  ready  to 
recognise them, as they have done in many occasions in the past; but, once stated their singular 
view-point, that is, the theoretical approach they refer to, the path is traced. Some improvements 
might ensue, of course, but hardly any dramatic change. Thus, discussion on the value of these 
indicators can only take place on two different levels: either external, that is, setting the value of 
one paradigm against the other; or internal, within the theoretical paradigm, evaluating whether the 
indicator adopted is indeed the best one, or it might be improved or partially changed. Outside these 
two levels of debate there is no place for discussion, nor, in fact, purpose.  
 
In these terms, all of them have an absolute quality. You might or might not agree with the theory, 
but if you do, there you have it. If one believes growth is still the key issue for ensuring the 
wellbeing of fellow human beings, then GDP, amended or not in one of the many ways proposed,  
is the indicator to consider. If one instead considers that satisfying the so-called basic needs is the 
preliminary condition for any kind of development, please refer to the set of indicators suggested by 
theory;  if,  finally,  one  thinks  that  means,  without  the  capabilities  of  using  them,  are  of  little 
significance, HDI might be the starting point. Otherwise, anyone might provide one’s own indicator 
based on his view of the world, society and human kind. 
 
But this correlation goes also the other way around: by adopting an indicator, or a set of indicators, 
as pivotal to determine the wellbeing of a society, leaders, policy-makers, academics, politicians 
also adopt a paradigm. By choosing the indicator, and focusing on improving its value, they also 
choose, knowingly or not, goals, policies, and instruments. They might discuss which policy might 
                                                 
10 “Sen was concerned by the difficulties of capturing the full complexity of human capabilities in a single index. But he 
was persuaded by Haq’s insistence that only a single number could shift the attention of policy-makers from material 
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be more appropriate, often bitterly  debating as to its effectiveness, but the frame is set.  
 
The thing is that, more often than not, the choice is not made consciously. The indicator, and the 
paradigm that comes with it, is chosen by default. A bit like the settings of a personal computer: 
you find them predetermined and just don’t bother to go into them. If they are like that there will 
surely be a reason. Are you a national leader? Everybody looks at the performance of GDP? Then 
you act to boost it. You work at the UN or at the World Bank? Is HDI the key indicator? Then let’s 
do something about it. At least until the next new device is invented. 
 
If we agree that the adoption of an indicator carries with it the adoption of certain goals instead of 
others, a question comes up immediately: when has the choice been made? and by whom? Are 
politicians really pursuing GDP growth, or the improvement of HDI, or of any other indicator 
because is on that that they have won the elections? because that is the mandate they have received? 
Have the goals implied by the indicator been discussed?  
 
Since indicators and goals are different faces of the same medal, and since the latter determine 
economic policy, which in turn affects the lives of the citizens of a state, shouldn’t their adoption 
derive from some sort of public debate or, better, from democratic legitimization? In other words, 
who should decide what effectively constitutes wellbeing for the people of a nation: academics and 
technocrats, or the people themselves?   
 
No matter how populist it might seem, we think that the decision should be on the people. Which 
might be simpler than it sounds at first, notwithstanding the objections that many economists might 
put forward on the complexity of the issues debated and on the technicalities they involve.  
 
Let’s turn the subject inside-out and focus on goals rather than on indicators, as it should be. Does 
the majority agree that environment is the critical issue? Then we might adopt or create an indicator 
focusing on variables that measure the erosion of the natural capital - pollution, or other similar 
aspects. Is growth the issue? Then welcome GDP. Obviously we are not proposing a periodical vote 
on goals and indicators. Not only would it be problematic, but it will be for certain of no use. These 
are  in  fact  the  kind  of  issues,  and  hence  of  goals,  which  are  often  debated  during  political 
campaigns for any major, or even minor, election as well as during many international meetings 
(EU, G-8, G-20, etc..). Here, we are only proposing a logical reverse - discuss the goals, choose 
among them,  and then coherently adopt the appropriate indicator. In this framework the value of an 
indicator is relative: it is sound and good if responds to the chosen goals, bad if it doesn’t. No more 
good or bad indicators in absolute terms. Less fascinating and more prosaic perhaps, but also more 
practical and useful. 
 
The world we live in already brings with it an example of the process we advocated above, and not 
a minor one. Some of the most rich and powerful nations of the world have already favoured and 
accepted  the  adoption  of  such  scheme.  The  democratically  elected  leaders  of  EU  nations  have 
indeed agreed on a set of goals, some specific, some more general. They regard environment (the 
“20-20-20”  scheme);  innovation,  technology  and  education  (Lisbon);  social  cohesion;  public 
finance; equal opportunities; growth. Not only have goals been set, but indicators have also been 
chosen so as to monitor any improvements recorded in these areas. To complete the process there is 
a short way to walk, at least conceptually (naturally it might prove much harder from a political 
point of view). Among the many goals EU leaders should choose the most relevant ones for the 
wellbeing of their citizens. They should really mean what they do and avoid the aftermath which 
followed the Lisbon strategy, officially stated but never really pursued. The first test is  to be seen 
with the follow-up of the environmental goals (20-20-20) set after a strong negotiation in December 
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Once a limited set of coherent and dominant goals is chosen, an indicator should be created to 
monitor the progress towards these goals. To give an example of how all this could work, we have 
given ourselves the fictitious power to select three dominant goals among the ones stated by the 
EU, and have then produced an indicator which we then have applied to the 27 EU countries plus 
Norway and Croatia  
 
 
5. Goal-based indicator: a proposal 
 
In the Lisbon European Council in 2000 the European Union set for the following decade the 
strategic goal "of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world  capable  of  sustainable  economic  growth  with  more  and  better  jobs  and  greater  social 
cohesion". (European Union, 2000)
11. In 2006 the four following areas were set as the cornerstones 
of  the  renewed  Lisbon  Strategy:  (i)  investing  in  knowledge  and  innovation,  (ii)  unlocking  the 
business potential, (iii) investing in people and modernising labour markets, (iv) and climate change 
and  energy  (European  Union  2009).  They  represent  goals  that,  while  derived  from  economic 
theories and analyses, have been set by political leaders, democratically elected by their citizen, 
after negotiations that have gone down to the small prints. While the process is certainly far from 
being  optimal,  it  still    represents  a  good  example  of  the  scheme  we  sketched  in  the  previous 
paragraph and a case where it is possible to apply our idea of a goal-based indicator.  
 
In this particular case, on the grounds of the EU goals quoted above, we are proposing a composite 
indicator  made  up  of  three  components,  each  measured  by  its  own  index:  competitiveness, 
environment and social cohesion. Blessed with the precious gift of originality we have named this 
indicator ICSES – Index of Competitiveness and Social and Environmental Sustainability. The 
variables used are among the ones chosen by Eurostat to monitor the trend of these dimensions  (all 
data come from Eurostat). Below we present the goals set by the EU and the variables we have 
chosen to monitor how single countries perform in to each given goal. 
 
i.  “The most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs.”. The council set  a 3% growth 
rate and full employment in Europe. To measure the performance of EU countries in this 
respect  we  have  used  the  following  three  variables:  real  GDP  growth  rate,  labour 
productivity per person employed, and the share of gross domestic expenditure on R&D. 
 
ii.  “..and respect for the environment“. In the early 2008 the European Commission put 
forward a far-reaching package of proposals meant to fight climate change and promote 
renewable energy up to 2020 and beyond. At the end of 2008 the European Parliament 
and Council reach an agreement to reduce by 2020 Europe’s overall emissions by at 
least 20% of the level recorded in 1990, and is ready to augment this reduction to as 
much  as  30%  under  a  new  global  climate  change  agreement  when  other  developed 
countries  will  agree  to  comparable  efforts.  The  EU  has  also  set  itself  the  target  of 
increasing by 2020 the share of renewable energy up to 20%. Hence, our environmental 
index is based on two variables - greenhouse gas emissions and electricity generated 
from renewable sources  as % of gross energy consumption. 
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iii.  “..and greater social cohesion”. A distinguishing feature of EU policy objectives is that 
they place as much emphasis on the achievement of social goals as on economic and 
political  aims.  The  social  cohesion  index  is  composed  of:  long-term  unemployment, 
regional employment dispersion rates, and existing inequality (the ratio of total income 
received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income). 
 
As in the case of other and much more famous composite indexes (HDI for instance) we have 
created an index to measure each of the dimensions cited above. To this aim, we first standardise 
the relevant variables (for example, in the case of the environment index, greenhouse gas emissions 
and electricity generated from renewable resources as % of gross energy consumption) with the 
following formula :  
 
Dimension index = actual value – minimum value / maximum value – minimum value    (1) 
 
We then create the dimension index by calculating the simple average of the variables used, and we 
do that for all three indexes. Finally, we calculate the composite ICSES as the simple average of 
these  three  indexes:  competiveness  (COM),  social  cohesion  (SOC),  environment  (ENV)
12.  The 
choice of the simple average reflects the idea that each European Union goal is equally relevant. 
This aggregative method is simple to implement and it has the advantage of being easy to interpret 
by examining separately the trend of each of the three indexes.  
 
Therefore, the final formulation of the ICSES, ranging from 0 to 10, is the following: 
 
ICSES = (1/3 (ENV) + 1/3 (SOC)  + 1/3 (COM))*10              (2) 
 
In table 1 we summarise the results for 1999 and 2006 the first and last year for which Eurostat 
provides  data.  The  data  for  the  two  years  well  synthesise  the  trend  for  the  whole  period.  The 
complete data set for the latter (1999-2006) is reported in the annex. 
 
A first distinction that emerges from the elaboration of the ICSES is the one between the EU-15 
countries and the Central and East European countries that have joined later the European Union. 
While the EU-15 countries have accomplished an improvement in the social cohesion dimension 
(SOC) that explains most of the ICSES growth between 1999 and 2006, Central and East European 
Countries, with the exception of the small Latvia and Lithuania, reveal a decrease in both their 
social cohesion (SOC) and environmental (ENV) dimensions, a decrease that has had a relevant 
impact in the overall performance of these countries.  
 
Taking a closer look we find that Nordic countries show an excellent performance in terms of 
ICSES: Norway (not a EU country) and Sweden hold respectively first and second place. This 
outcome is explained mainly by the environment component that in the two countries registers 
values that are twice the ones observed in other countries. The outstanding outcome of Latvia (3) is 
explained by the social cohesion and environment components. United Kingdom (5) and Italy (7) 
show a good performance in terms of ICSES: the former because of the competitiveness dimension 
(COM), the latter thanks to the social cohesion dimension (SOC). France ranks in the middle (13), 
mainly because of the poor performance of the social cohesion dimension (due mainly to regional 
disparities) that offsets the good results of the other two dimensions. Germany’s low ranking (24) is 
                                                 
12 In order to evaluate whether a composite index is a good one, there should be two fundamental conditions: (i) the 
components should not be highly correlated with each other, and (ii) the index itself should not be highly correlated 
with any of its single components. If these criteria are satisfied, the composite index is not redundant (Noorbakhsh, 
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determined mainly by the social cohesion component highlighting the problems derived from the 
re-unification process. Bottom ranks are held by former Central-Oriental European countries such 
as Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, mainly because of social cohesion component (SOC). Which is 
not surprising if one considers that the economic transformation these countries have undergone has 
affected the relation among urban centres and the countryside and increased inequality between top 
and bottom layers of society. At the very bottom we find Cyprus, ranking very poorly in all three 
dimensions, with the environmental and social dimensions getting even worse than before. 
 
 
In  table  2  we  have  compared  the  ICSES  ranking  with  the  one  based  on  HDI  and  GDP.  The 
comparison is recorded for  2006.. It might be worth noticing that Norway, Latvia and Sweden hold 
a  lower  position  in  the  ranking  based  on  GDP  than  in  the  ones  based  on  ICSES  and  HDI. 
Conversely, Croatia (+12) and Hungary (+11) show a good ICSES performance with respect to 
their GDP ranking - Croatia (another non-EU country) because of the good performance of the 
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Table 1. ICSES components, 1999–2006 (range  0-10) 
           
Rank 






    1999  2006  1999  2006  1999  2006  1999  2006 
1  Norway  3,314  3,845  0,561  0,561  -0,036  0,045  0,469  0,547 
2  Sweden  2,913  3,051  0,450  0,450  -0,245  -0,202  0,669  0,668 
3  Latvia  1,627  2,891  0,477  0,443  -0,189  0,003  0,200  0,421 
4  Austria  2,797  2,712  0,489  0,429  -0,165  -0,169  0,514  0,554 
5  United Kingdom  2,476  2,604  0,244  0,258  0,012  0,047  0,487  0,476 
6  Lithuania  1,319  2,514  0,320  0,307  -0,052  0,086  0,127  0,362 
7  Italy  2,160  2,453  0,315  0,306  -0,091  0,027  0,424  0,403 
8  Finland  2,427  2,424  0,290  0,265  -0,180  -0,192  0,618  0,655 
9  Denmark  1,844  2,189  0,250  0,301  -0,197  -0,176  0,500  0,532 
10  Spain  1,837  2,160  0,305  0,314  -0,174  -0,092  0,421  0,427 
11  Hungary  1,745  2,157  0,286  0,294  -0,061  0,005  0,298  0,348 
12  Ireland  2,165  2,107  0,165  0,196  -0,119  -0,111  0,603  0,547 
13  France  2,212  2,046  0,317  0,313  -0,203  -0,215  0,549  0,515 
14  Croatia  2,231  2,008  0,458  0,405  -0,014  -0,152  0,225  0,350 
15  Portugal  2,128  2,004  0,345  0,379  -0,016  -0,070  0,309  0,291 
16  Slovenia  2,004  1,994  0,366  0,331  -0,176  -0,186  0,412  0,454 
17  Netherlands  1,934  1,871  0,218  0,245  -0,165  -0,170  0,528  0,486 
18  Greece  1,512  1,780  0,267  0,268  -0,155  -0,116  0,342  0,382 
19  Estonia  0,849  1,759  0,212  0,205  -0,134  -0,130  0,176  0,452 
20  Belgium  1,676  1,749  0,204  0,227  -0,253  -0,232  0,552  0,530 
21  Romania  1,112  1,671  0,428  0,394  -0,194  -0,189  0,100  0,297 
22  Malta  1,149  1,651  0,287  0,281  -0,175  -0,128  0,233  0,342 
23  Luxembourg  2,120  1,586  0,097  0,025  -0,176  -0,229  0,715  0,680 
24  Germany  1,565  1,489  0,240  0,265  -0,285  -0,356  0,515  0,538 
25  Czech Republic  1,168  1,410  0,219  0,212  -0,151  -0,226  0,282  0,438 
26  Slovakia  0,971  1,273  0,318  0,321  -0,233  -0,323  0,206  0,384 
27  Poland  1,241  0,952  0,255  0,257  -0,159  -0,294  0,276  0,323 
28  Bulgaria  0,348  0,854  0,300  0,301  -0,374  -0,303  0,178  0,259 
29  Cyprus  1,322  0,799  0,225  0,214  -0,147  -0,297  0,318  0,323 
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Table 2. Compared ranks for different indices (2006) 
 
COUNTRIES 
ICSES  HDI  
 
GDP   IScES   ICSES - HDI  ICSES - GDP 
Norway  1  1  2  1  0  1 
Sweden  2  4  6  2  2  4 
Latvia  3  26  24  3  23  21 
Austria  4  9  5  4  5  1 
United Kingdom  5  14  10  5  9  5 
Lithuania  6  25  25  6  19  19 
Italy  7  13  13  7  6  6 
Finland  8  7  7  8  -1  -1 
Denmark  9  8  9  9  -1  0 
Spain  10  10  14  10  0  4 
Hungary  11  21  22  11  10  11 
Ireland  12  2  3  12  -10  -9 
France  13  6  12  13  -7  -1 
Croatia  14  27  26  14  13  12 
Portugal  15  18  20  15  3  5 
Slovenia  16  16  17  16  0  1 
Netherlands  17  3  4  17  -14  -13 
Greece  18  12  15  18  -6  -3 
Estonia  19  24  21  19  5  2 
Belgium  20  11  11  20  -9  -9 
Romania  21  29  28  21  8  7 
Malta  22  20  18  22  -2  -4 
Luxembourg  23  5  1  23  -18  -22 
Germany  24  15  8  24  -9  -16 
Czech Republic  25  19  19  25  -6  -6 
Slovakia  26  23  23  26  -3  -3 
Poland  27  22  27  27  -5  0 
Bulgaria  28  28  29  28  0  1 
Cyprus  29  17  16  29  -12  -13 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper has been to try to go behind the usual dispute on the soundness of this or that 
indicator to highlight the fact that until indicators are expression of a theoretical paradigma, while 
useful, they remain biased. A bias that is transmitted to policy-makers and hence to the policies that 
they pursue. Referring to an indicator instead of another is anything but a neutral choice. It means 
choosing a goal, or a set of goals, for a society to aim to. A choice that, because it affects the life of 
people,  its  wellbeing,  should  be  the  object  of  public  debate  and  of  some  sort  of  democratic 
legitimization and not derive from the mainstream economic theory of that moment.  
 
It is for this reason that, after having tried to go behind, we also propose to go beyond this kind of 
dispute. We propose to turn upside down the approach to this issue and focus on the goals a society 
intends to pursue in a given historical period. Once these goals have been debated and chosen 
through the democratic and political process, then and only then indicators should become an issue. 
And the issue would be limited in choosing the best indicator to monitor the rate of achieving of the 
stated goals. This, obviously, is not to say that economic theory is or should be irrelevant, but only 
that it should  make a step backwards, helping to highlight the implications and consequences of the 
different choices and providing information on how the economic system works and might evolve 
and the policies that could be implemented. What is the kind of wellbeing a society should aim to 
should be a choice of the society itself. 
 
As  an  example  of  how  the  process  might  work  we  have  referred  to  the  goals  stated  by  the 
governments  of  the  European  Union  and  have  then  elaborated  a  synthetic  indicator  of  how 
European countries are doing in respect to these goals. It is only an example, and an incomplete 
one. The next step will be to define benchmarks for each of these goals and then measure how far is 
each country from them, that is to say of elaborating a goal-accomplishment indicator. 
 
We  wish  to  conclude  by  citing  a  contribute  that  Giorgio  Ruffolo  has  send  to  us  during  the 
elaboration  of  this  paper:  “the  incommensurable  advantage  of  a  normative  and  programmatic 
approach is that it would allow to base political programs, and in more general terms political 
action and debate, on real and quantifiable criteria, and not on petty words. Indicators would then 
assume the nature of counter posed political options: of an economy based on political choices and 
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ANNEX A 
  
Table A1. ICSES trends 1999-2006                 
COUNTRIES  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Austria  2,80  2,84  2,57  2,62  2,54  2,62  2,68  2,71 
Belgium  1,68  1,84  1,68  1,67  1,64  1,68  1,58  1,75 
Bulgaria  0,35  0,52  0,24  0,26  0,47  0,79  0,82  0,85 
Croatia  2,23  2,47  2,57  1,86  1,84  2,04  1,96  2,01 
Cyprus  1,32  1,33  1,22  0,96  0,71  0,82  0,89  0,80 
Czech Republic  1,17  1,22  1,08  1,06  1,14  1,17  1,34  1,41 
Denmark  1,84  2,03  1,86  1,92  1,98  2,14  2,20  2,19 
Estonia  0,85  1,46  1,27  1,32  1,34  1,54  1,59  1,76 
Finland  2,43  2,60  2,36  2,26  2,15  2,38  2,40  2,42 
France  2,21  2,26  2,18  2,11  2,01  2,10  2,00  2,05 
Germany  1,57  1,66  1,46  1,36  1,33  1,28  1,28  1,49 
Greece  1,51  1,52  1,54  1,53  1,79  1,65  1,56  1,78 
Hungary  1,74  1,79  1,79  1,84  1,87  1,89  1,94  2,16 
Ireland  2,16  2,11  1,87  1,99  1,96  2,01  2,11  2,11 
Italy  2,16  2,30  2,25  2,15  2,10  2,40  2,32  2,45 
Latvia  1,63  1,98  2,03  1,99  2,05  2,24  2,61  2,89 
Lithuania  1,32  1,49  1,55  1,76  2,10  1,97  2,42  2,51 
Luxembourg  2,12  2,04  1,52  1,53  1,33  1,39  1,41  1,59 
Malta  1,15  1,26  1,27  1,59  1,37  1,51  1,63  1,65 
Netherlands  1,93  1,97  1,84  1,71  1,70  1,79  1,78  1,87 
Norway  3,31  3,79  3,53  3,58  3,49  3,61  3,89  3,85 
Poland  1,24  1,07  0,67  0,38  0,51  0,59  0,76  0,95 
Portugal  2,13  2,26  2,24  2,07  2,12  1,97  1,79  2,00 
Romania  1,11  1,17  1,42  1,30  1,25  1,51  1,44  1,67 
Slovakia  0,97  0,82  0,82  0,82  0,80  0,82  0,98  1,27 
Slovenia  2,00  1,85  1,76  1,75  1,56  1,80  1,81  1,99 
Spain  1,84  1,92  1,98  1,82  1,93  1,90  2,04  2,16 
Sweden  2,91  3,17  2,98  2,87  2,78  2,93  3,01  3,05 
United Kingdom  2,48  2,55  2,50  2,54  2,55  2,57  2,62  2,60 
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Table A2. Environment index trends 1999-2006 
 
COUNTRIES  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Austria  0,49  0,49  0,47  0,46  0,41  0,43  0,43  0,43 
Belgium  0,20  0,20  0,20  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,22  0,23 
Bulgaria  0,30  0,30  0,29  0,29  0,29  0,30  0,30  0,30 
Croatia  0,46  0,44  0,45  0,41  0,39  0,43  0,41  0,40 
Cyprus  0,23  0,22  0,22  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21 
Czech Republic  0,22  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21 
Denmark  0,25  0,27  0,27  0,28  0,28  0,31  0,32  0,30 
Estonia  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,21  0,20  0,19  0,20  0,21 
Finland  0,29  0,30  0,28  0,27  0,24  0,28  0,30  0,26 
France  0,32  0,31  0,32  0,31  0,31  0,31  0,31  0,31 
Germany  0,24  0,24  0,24  0,25  0,25  0,25  0,26  0,26 
Greece  0,27  0,26  0,25  0,25  0,26  0,26  0,26  0,27 
Hungary  0,29  0,29  0,28  0,29  0,28  0,29  0,30  0,29 
Ireland  0,17  0,16  0,16  0,17  0,17  0,18  0,18  0,20 
Italy  0,31  0,31  0,31  0,30  0,30  0,31  0,30  0,31 
Latvia  0,48  0,49  0,48  0,46  0,44  0,48  0,48  0,44 
Lithuania  0,32  0,32  0,32  0,32  0,31  0,31  0,31  0,31 
Luxembourg  0,10  0,09  0,08  0,06  0,05  0,01  0,02  0,03 
Malta  0,29  0,29  0,29  0,29  0,28  0,28  0,28  0,28 
Netherlands  0,22  0,22  0,22  0,22  0,23  0,23  0,24  0,24 
Norway  0,56  0,60  0,55  0,59  0,54  0,53  0,59  0,56 
Poland  0,26  0,26  0,26  0,26  0,26  0,26  0,26  0,26 
Portugal  0,34  0,38  0,39  0,34  0,40  0,36  0,33  0,38 
Romania  0,43  0,40  0,39  0,40  0,37  0,39  0,41  0,39 
Slovakia  0,32  0,32  0,32  0,33  0,30  0,31  0,32  0,32 
Slovenia  0,37  0,37  0,36  0,34  0,33  0,35  0,33  0,33 
Spain  0,30  0,31  0,33  0,30  0,33  0,31  0,30  0,31 
Sweden  0,45  0,47  0,46  0,44  0,41  0,44  0,47  0,45 
United Kingdom  0,24  0,24  0,24  0,25  0,25  0,25  0,26  0,26 
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Table A3. Social Cohesion index trends 1999-2006 
 
COUNTRIES  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Austria  -0,16  -0,17  -0,17  -0,17  -0,14  -0,17  -0,17  -0,17 
Belgium  -0,25  -0,22  -0,22  -0,23  -0,22  -0,24  -0,25  -0,23 
Bulgaria  -0,37  -0,38  -0,43  -0,44  -0,38  -0,32  -0,31  -0,30 
Croatia  -0,01  -0,01  -0,01  -0,22  -0,20  -0,17  -0,17  -0,15 
Cyprus  -0,15  -0,15  -0,17  -0,20  -0,27  -0,28  -0,26  -0,30 
Czech Republic  -0,15  -0,17  -0,20  -0,20  -0,21  -0,23  -0,22  -0,23 
Denmark  -0,20  -0,19  -0,19  -0,20  -0,18  -0,19  -0,18  -0,18 
Estonia  -0,13  -0,13  -0,16  -0,16  -0,14  -0,09  -0,13  -0,13 
Finland  -0,18  -0,18  -0,18  -0,18  -0,19  -0,20  -0,20  -0,19 
France  -0,20  -0,20  -0,19  -0,19  -0,21  -0,20  -0,22  -0,21 
Germany  -0,29  -0,28  -0,30  -0,32  -0,33  -0,37  -0,37  -0,36 
Greece  -0,15  -0,17  -0,15  -0,15  -0,12  -0,15  -0,14  -0,12 
Hungary  -0,06  -0,08  -0,08  -0,08  -0,06  -0,07  -0,05  0,00 
Ireland  -0,12  -0,11  -0,11  -0,11  -0,10  -0,10  -0,10  -0,11 
Italy  -0,09  -0,08  -0,07  -0,05  -0,05  0,02  0,02  0,03 
Latvia  -0,19  -0,17  -0,17  -0,13  -0,12  -0,13  -0,07  0,00 
Lithuania  -0,05  -0,12  -0,16  -0,10  -0,07  -0,07  0,06  0,09 
Luxembourg  -0,18  -0,19  -0,20  -0,21  -0,22  -0,22  -0,23  -0,23 
Malta  -0,17  -0,15  -0,13  -0,11  -0,11  -0,12  -0,14  -0,13 
Netherlands  -0,17  -0,14  -0,13  -0,14  -0,14  -0,16  -0,17  -0,17 
Norway  -0,04  0,00  0,01  0,00  0,02  0,01  0,03  0,05 
Poland  -0,16  -0,21  -0,27  -0,37  -0,38  -0,39  -0,31  -0,29 
Portugal  -0,02  -0,01  0,00  0,02  0,01  -0,03  -0,06  -0,07 
Romania  -0,19  -0,21  -0,20  -0,22  -0,22  -0,23  -0,19  -0,19 
Slovakia  -0,23  -0,31  -0,35  -0,38  -0,36  -0,37  -0,37  -0,32 
Slovenia  -0,18  -0,21  -0,20  -0,21  -0,22  -0,21  -0,20  -0,19 
Spain  -0,17  -0,16  -0,13  -0,15  -0,15  -0,15  -0,10  -0,09 
Sweden  -0,24  -0,23  -0,21  -0,21  -0,21  -0,22  -0,22  -0,20 
United Kingdom  0,01  0,02  0,04  0,05  0,04  0,05  0,07  0,05 
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Table A4. Competitiveness index trends 1999-2006 
 
COUNTRIES  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Austria  0,51  0,53  0,47  0,50  0,49  0,53  0,54  0,55 
Belgium  0,55  0,57  0,51  0,52  0,50  0,53  0,51  0,53 
Bulgaria  0,18  0,24  0,21  0,22  0,23  0,26  0,25  0,26 
Croatia  0,23  0,30  0,33  0,36  0,36  0,35  0,34  0,35 
Cyprus  0,32  0,33  0,31  0,28  0,27  0,32  0,32  0,32 
Czech Republic  0,28  0,33  0,31  0,30  0,35  0,37  0,41  0,44 
Denmark  0,50  0,53  0,48  0,49  0,49  0,52  0,52  0,53 
Estonia  0,18  0,36  0,33  0,34  0,34  0,36  0,41  0,45 
Finland  0,62  0,66  0,61  0,59  0,59  0,64  0,62  0,65 
France  0,55  0,56  0,52  0,51  0,50  0,52  0,51  0,52 
Germany  0,51  0,53  0,49  0,47  0,48  0,50  0,49  0,54 
Greece  0,34  0,37  0,37  0,36  0,40  0,39  0,35  0,38 
Hungary  0,30  0,33  0,33  0,34  0,34  0,35  0,34  0,35 
Ireland  0,60  0,58  0,51  0,53  0,51  0,52  0,55  0,55 
Italy  0,42  0,46  0,43  0,39  0,38  0,40  0,38  0,40 
Latvia  0,20  0,28  0,30  0,28  0,29  0,32  0,38  0,42 
Lithuania  0,13  0,25  0,31  0,32  0,39  0,34  0,35  0,36 
Luxembourg  0,72  0,71  0,57  0,61  0,57  0,63  0,63  0,68 
Malta  0,23  0,23  0,22  0,30  0,24  0,29  0,35  0,34 
Netherlands  0,53  0,51  0,47  0,42  0,43  0,47  0,46  0,49 
Norway  0,47  0,53  0,50  0,49  0,49  0,55  0,55  0,55 
Poland  0,28  0,27  0,21  0,22  0,28  0,31  0,28  0,32 
Portugal  0,31  0,31  0,28  0,25  0,22  0,27  0,27  0,29 
Romania  0,10  0,16  0,23  0,22  0,22  0,29  0,22  0,30 
Slovakia  0,21  0,23  0,28  0,30  0,30  0,31  0,34  0,38 
Slovenia  0,41  0,39  0,37  0,40  0,36  0,41  0,41  0,45 
Spain  0,42  0,43  0,40  0,39  0,40  0,40  0,41  0,43 
Sweden  0,67  0,71  0,64  0,64  0,63  0,66  0,65  0,67 
United Kingdom  0,49  0,50  0,47  0,47  0,48  0,47  0,46  0,48 
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data. 
               
 